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After several monographic studies on the careers and traditions pertain-
ing to the greatest Athenian strategoi of the fourth century B.C., such as 
Iphicrates, Chabrias, Chares and Timotheus
1
, the time has come to provide 
an overall view of the interpretations that the main literary sources offer
 2
 
and here I intend to focus in particular on Xenophon. 
As far as the operations of these generals are concerned, this author of-
ten provides details that diverge from those found in other authors. Some-
times he contradicts them, sometimes omits important information, revealing 
that what he stresses or neglects probably fits more  his political or moral 
background than his interest in the reconstruction of the precise historical 
context
3
. 
Obviously, the case of the Athenian strategoi is only an example and 
should be seen into a more general analysis of individuals in Xenophon. This 
study instead only aims to fill a little gap, since usually in works on this sub-
 
1
 See BIANCO 1997, 2000, 2003, 2007. 
2
 My forthcoming analysis of the Ephorean tradition, (and also Diodorean in the pro-
ceedings of the Congress “Eforo di Cuma nella storiografia greca” (Salerno 10-
12/12/2008, ed. by P. DE FIDIO), with the specular title “Eforo e la tradizione sugli strate-
ghi del IV secolo” can be considered parallel to this work on Xenophon. For the relation-
ship between Ephorus and Xenophon see Daverio Rocchi’s contribution in the same forth-
coming volume. 
3
 See GIRAUD 2000, 101: “La distance est grande entre les Hélleniques et la réalité; 
entre les deux se trouvent les convictions que l’auteur veut faire partager”. 
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ject generals are not taken into account
4
. Probably, this is the consequence of 
the fact that in Xenophon’s works they do not feature prominently part and 
never speak
5
. Nevertheless, the study of their treatment could be interesting. 
Xenophon’s attitude towards these strategoi is very peculiar indeed and 
seems to respond to a general desire to play down the new Athenian hegem-
ony and to ascribe its success to the Spartan crisis. He tends to omit or men-
tion only some of the greatest political and military events of the Athenian 
history of these years, thus obliterating as much as possible its chief expo-
nents
6
. 
Still we can notice that, beside the little interest shown for example in 
Chabrias (whose enterprises are systematically downplayed, even in the case 
of the great victory at Naxus), he has a more benevolent attitude toward 
Timotheus and Chares (who, on the contrary, is often criticized by other 
sources), and even a certain interest in Iphicrates’ affairs. 
Xenophon’s attitude towards the Athenian strategoi is not uniform, 
since it is possible to point out many differences in their treatment. Our aim, 
however, is to investigate whether he succeeded in reconstructing the activi-
ties of these strategoi, by comparing his work with other traditions and look-
ing for possible reasons to these changes.  
 
The strategos to whom Xenophon shows the greatest goodwill is certainly 
Iphicrates. This is also the most cited in the Hellenica, which is indeed the only 
work where  Athenian strategoi appear (29 occurrences of Iphicrates, compared 
with 7 of Chabrias, 12 of Timotheus, and 13 of Chares). 
In spite of that, it is not necessary to insist too much on Xenophon’s fa-
vour towards him, because his attitude is not unambiguous. For example, the 
beginnings of Iphicrates’ career are not described in a very gratifying man-
 
4
 The attention of the scholars is usually focused on Cyrus, Agesilaus, Teleutias, Ja-
son, etc.: see for example WESTLAKE 1969, 203-225; HIGGINS 1977; WORONOFF 1993, 41-
48; AZOULAY 2004, 217-221. 
5
 The importance of speeches in Xenophon as a way to portray characters is well-
known: see for example GRAY 1989, 137; PITCHER 2007, 111. 
6
 For the slight attention paid to “prominent personalities of the New Imperialism”, 
see TUPLIN 1993, 159. According to LÉVY 1990, 127: “l’attitude à l’ègard des personnages 
importants de son histoire a aussi suscité des discussions”. 
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ner (IV, 4, 9-12): he appears on the stage as a commander of an army of very 
frightening mercenary peltasts, whose results are not significant
7
. 
He depicts his first intervention in the Peloponnesian affairs between 
393 and 392 as a defeat. The Spartan Praxitas, despite the opposition of Ar-
gives, Corinthians and Iphicrates’ mercenaries, was able to cross the wall 
that connected Corinth to the port of the Lechaion and conquered additional 
positions in the region. Iphicrates’ men reacted by storming Phliasia and Ar-
cadia, plundering and provoking fear. Still they only convinced the inhabi-
tants of Phlius to surrender to the Spartans; moreover, in spite of the recon-
struction of the wall of the Lechaion, they could not hinder the joint attack of 
Agesilaus and Teleutias (IV, 4, 15)
8
. 
The insistence on the fear caused by these Athenian soldiers recalls 
more the description of an armed band than of a regular army. The results 
thus obtained were not certainly positive, but rather counterproductive, be-
cause they alienated a still neutral polis.  
The parallel Diodorean account has a different tone (XIV, 91): it under-
lines some successful interventions of Iphicrates, who seems to have rejected 
the option to attack Corinth with the help of those in exile. Instead he de-
feated a part of the Lacedemonian army in the area and obtained victories 
against Phlius and Sicyon.   
These two traditions are not consistent with each other. Xenophon 
seems to emphasize only the less positive aspects of Iphicrates’ intervention, 
thus favouring the Spartans.   
The same viewpoint returns in the description of the events in the Co-
rinthian area, where Iphicrates’ peltasts operated (IV, 5, 3): he focused on 
Agesilaus, to whom is attributed a victorious stratagem (IV, 5, 4). In this text 
he appears to control the other Corinthian port, the Peiraion, even if simulta-
neously he receives the news of the defeat of a Spartan mora at the Lechaion 
(IV, 5, 7). 
Xenophon follows only Agesilaus’ successes, and, at the beginning, he 
is completely silent on Iphicrates’ role.  Only after several paragraphs he 
 
7
 Xenophon seems right to think that in this phase Iphicrates, being of young age, 
could be only archon of the mercenaries and not the general elected by the polis (see Iust. 
VI, 5, 2-5; Oros. III, 1, 21). Probably Xenophon participated in Agesilaus’ campaign of 390 
and for this reason he was well informed (see also Ages. 2, 18-19; Plut. Ages. 22). 
8
 For these events, see also Andoc. III, 18; Diod. XIV, 86, 3; 91. 
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mentions this Spartan defeat, which he describes as unusual and almost in-
credible (ajhvqou" ... sumfora`": IV, 5, 10). He even attributes it to the 
strategos Callias and Iphicrates, who is still represented as commander of 
the mercenaries
9
.  
Even if the role of the latter is commonly considered more decisive, 
Xenophon emphasizes above all Callias, who seems to be more favoured by 
the historian and is one of the protagonists in the Symposium too (1, 2 etc.). 
Here he appears to be one of the men who contributed to the greatness of 
Athens: it is likely that in this positive portrait an important role is played by 
the common Socratic experience, his moderate political ideas and his Spar-
tan sympathies.   
From now on, however, Iphicrates emerges as a very able commander, 
who obtains several successes (ejk touvtou de; mavla kai; ta\lla ejpetuvgcanen 
jIfikravth": IV, 5, 19) and recovers most of the positions that the Spartans 
had occupied beforehand.  Xenophon, however, stops his account immedi-
ately afterwards to focus instead on Agesilaus
10
.   
Iphicrates returns in 389 on the occasion of the naval expedition to the 
Hellespont that the Athenians sent under Agyrrius’ command, who had re-
placed the dead Thrasybulus; but soon after, Iphicrates and 1200 peltasts 
were sent to ensure that Agyrrius did not vanish the results obtained by his 
predecessor (IV, 8, 31-34). Here, however, Xenophon emphasizes in a nega-
tive way the character of Agyrrius, revealing the Athenians’ distrust towards 
him, more than praising Iphicrates. Even when he describes some of the op-
erations of the strategos in the Chersonesus, he mentions pirates (lh/stav": 
IV, 8, 35) and stresses the figure of the Spartan opponent, Anaxibius, who 
courageously dies together with his men in a clash near Abydus (IV, 8, 38-
39)
11
.   
Incomplete and obscure is also the Xenophontic account of Iphicrates’ 
role in the control of the Straits at the end of the Corinthian War in 387; it is 
 
9
 Iphicrates’ role is always discussed, because, unlike Xenophon, Harpocration holds 
that he was strategos, even if less convincingly (s. v. xeniko;n ejn Korivnqw/ = Androt. 
FGrHist 324 F 48 = Philoch. FGrHist 328 F 150; DEVELIN 1989).  
10
 For Agesilaus’ operations in this context, see CARTLEDGE 1987, 222; HAMILTON 
1991, 114. 
11
 See now GRAY 2007, 342-344, who underlines this account as a Xenophontic les-
son on the “dangers of over-confidence”. 
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only thanks to Polyaenus that we can explain the development of the Athe-
nian operations. From a short passage of Xenophon (V, 1, 25-27), in fact, we 
know that Iphicrates was in Abydus to block the Spartan fleet, when the 
enemies reached an advantageous position thanks to Antalcidas’ arrival. This 
pretended to be called in aid of Chalcedon, but instead waited in ambush and 
succeeded in removing the Athenians from that area and destroying eight 
ships. 
Xenophon’s account lacks the key to understand the situation, because 
Iphicrates seems stationary in Abydus and is not mentioned among the de-
ceived strategoi who set off in pursuit of Antalcidas. Moreover, the reason 
of the false intervention of the Spartans in aid of Calchedon is unclear.   
It is a neglected stratagem of Polyaenus (II, 24) that explains the situa-
tion. There we can read that Iphicrates left Abydus to besiege Calchedon and 
that  the other strategoi moved there in order to help him, after hearing that 
Antalcidas was also going there. Only they were deceived and attacked by 
the enemies
12
.   
Thus the context becomes clearer and acquires a new meaning, that ap-
parently Xenophon was not interested in explaining. If he had really wanted 
to underline positively the character of Iphicrates, he should not have hidden 
these details that relieved the strategos from the responsibility of a disastrous 
operation.   
The historian shows a certain admiration and interest in Iphicrates  
above all in book six, after a long silence on the activity of the strategos
13
: 
here we can really say that he is one of the most enlightened Athenian pro-
tagonists of the 370s
14
.  
 
12
 I recently analyzed this text in BIANCO 2010. 
13
 Fortunately other sources give us further information about his operations in Thrace 
in the 80s (see for example Nep. Iph. 2, 1; Polyaen. III, 9, 46; 50; 60; 62, etc.), or in Egypt 
from 377/6 on (Diod. XV, 29, 3-4; 41; Polyaen. III, 9, 56; 59; 63, etc.). 
14
 These judgments, so favourable, always impressed scholars, who sometimes consi-
dered them exaggerated, see for example KRAFFT 1967, 135; MOSLEY 1974, 65-68. For 
Xenophon’s admiration of Iphicrates’ military skills see also WESTLAKE 1969, 207; 
AZOULAY 2004, 130. 
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As strategos, in 373 he replaced Timotheus, who had been removed
15
, 
as commander of the naval expedition sent to help Corcyra, where he 
showed his extreme energy (VI, 2, 13-14) and ability in leading the fleet and 
keeping it trained (VI, 2, 27 sgg.). At this point, Xenophon introduces the 
first explicit praise about his admirable skill to train his men in fighting 
without delaying the navigation (VI, 2, 32: “Now I am aware that all these 
matters of practice and training are customary whenever men expect to en-
gage in a battle by sea, but that which I commend in Iphicrates is this, that 
when it was incumbent upon him to arrive speedily at the place where he 
supposed he should fight with the enemy, he discovered a way to keep his 
men from being either, by reason of the voyage they had made, unskilled in 
the tactics of fighting at sea, or, by reason of their having been trained in 
such tactics, any the more tardy in arriving at their destination”)
16
. 
In this way, the strategos obtained the control of Kephallenia, defeated 
several triremes that Dionysius of Syracuse sent off to help the Spartans. He 
fought in Acarnania, and caused problems in the Peloponnesus.  At the con-
clusion of this long list of successes (VI, 2, 33-38), we find the most famous 
praise of Xenophon for this strategos: “Now for my part I not only commend 
this campaign in particular among all the campaigns of Iphicrates, but I 
commend, further, his directing the Athenians to choose as his colleagues 
Callistratus, the popular orator, who was not very favourably inclined toward 
him, and Chabrias, who was regarded as a very good general. For if he 
thought them to be able men and hence wished to take them as advisers, he 
seems to me to have done a wise thing, while on the other hand if he be-
lieved them to be his adversaries and wished in so bold a way to prove that 
he was neither remiss nor neglectful in any point, this seems to me to be the 
 
15
 Xenophon relates Timotheus’ delays in leaving for Corcyra and his destitution 
from the strategy, although he doesn’t speak of a trial, but see Diod. XV, 47 and infra. On 
the difficult interpretation of these traditions, see also GRAY 1980, 306-326; TUPLIN 1984, 
537-568; FAUBER 1999, 481-506; PARKER 2001, 353-368. 
16
 Tou`to ejpainw`, o{ti ejpei; ajfikevsqai tacu; e[dei e[nqa toi`" polemivoi" naumachvsein 
w/[eto, hu{reto Ê o{pw" mhvte dia; to;n plou`n ajnepisthvmona" ei\nai tw`n eij" naumacivan mhvte 
dia; to; tau`ta meleta`n braduvterovn ti ajfikevsqai. All Xenophon’s English translations are 
by BROWNSON 1918-21. 
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act of a man possessed of great confidence in himself. He, then, was occu-
pied with these things”  (VI, 2, 39)
17
. 
This praise, however, is not consistent with what the historian said in 
the previous chapters, because it presupposes facts he actually avoids men-
tioning: the most obvious, for example, is the action brought by Callistratus 
and Iphicrates against Timotheus in 373 that we know from other sources
18
, 
while the connection with Chabrias is darker, maybe only for his link with 
Callistratus.   
Generally speaking, Xenophon shows ambiguous feelings towards 
many other Athenian strategoi: Conon (who is a protagonist of the first 
book, whereas his role in the victory at Cnidus and in the reconstruction of 
the Athenian hegemony is not emphasized
19
), Callistratus (who first is re-
membered superficially only on the occasion of the naval expedition to Cor-
cyra, whereas later plays an important part in the peace between Athens and 
Sparta in 369
20
) and, as we saw, he is explicitly hostile towards Agyrrius.   
If Iphicrates is not affected negatively, it means perhaps that at least at 
the beginning of his career he was an outsider
21
, but later he was compelled 
to approach Callistratus and Chabrias for political reasons of opportunity, 
whose need is recognized by the historian. A sign of these new relations is 
also the fact that in 372 Xenophon attributes to Callistratus the engagement 
to send money to Iphicrates to support the fleet or to make peace (VI, 3, 3; 4, 
 
17
  jEgw; me;n dh; tauvthn th;n strathgivan tw`n  jIfikravtou" oujc h{kista ejpainw`, e[peita 
kai; to; proselevsqai keleu`sai eJautw`/ Kallivstratovn te to;n dhmhgovron, ouj mavla ejpithv-
deion o[nta, kai; Cabrivan, mavla strathgo;n nomizovmenon. Ei[te ga;r fronivmou" aujtou;" 
hjgouvmeno" ei\nai sumbouvlou" labei`n ejbouvleto, sw`frovn moi dokei` diapravxasqai, ei[te 
ajntipavlou" nomivzwn, ou{tw qrasevw" mhvte katara/qumw`n mhvte katamelw`n mhde;n faivne-
sqai, megalofronou`nto" ejf¯ eJautw`/ tou`tov moi dokei` ajndro;" ei\nai. 
18
 See above all Ps.-Demosth. XLIX, 9; Diod. XV, 47, 3. HANSEN 1983, 169; TUPLIN 
1984, 539 and infra. 
19
 Hell. IV, 3, 11; 8, 1, gives the impression that this naval battle was a Persian suc-
cess, more than an Athenian one, against the Spartans. TUPLIN too (1993, 80) underlines 
that Xenophon was not interested in Conon, who is considered only as a Persian agent. 
20
 See Hell. VI, 2, 39; 3, 3; CLOCHÉ 1923, 14-16; BEARZOT 1978-1979, 7-27.  
21
 See supra and BIANCO 1997, 192. STRAUSS (1986, 133 and 156), on the contrary, 
thought of Iphicrates as a Conon’s protégé. 
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1); thanks to this change in the Callistratus’politics and to his attempts at 
peace, this rhetor seems to gain credit anew in Xenophon’s eyes
22
. 
After this laudatory parenthesis towards Iphicrates, the strategos van-
ishes again from the political stage, to re-emerge in the days of the opera-
tions in the Peloponnesus against the Thebans in 369. Here we can find a 
judgment unequivocally not gratifying on part of Xenophon, who says that 
Iphicrates, although a good general, in this case lead useless – or rather in-
convenient – operations (eij me;n ou\n a[llo ti kalw`" ejstrathvghsen, ouj 
yevgw: ejkei`na mevntoi a} ejn tw/` crovnw/ ejkeivnw/ e[praxe, pavnta euJrivskw ta; 
me;n mavthn, ta; de; kai; ajsumfovrw" pepragmevna aujtw/`: VI, 5, 51)
23
.   
Actually, the strategos probably gained some results, because both Ne-
pos (Iph.  2, 5) and Pausanias (IX, 14, 6-7) seem to attribute to Iphicrates’ 
arrival the withdrawal of Epaminondas who left without attacking Sparta
24
. 
Xenophon’s interpretation could mean that he would have preferred a 
stronger help for Sparta, and was instead disappointed by the Athenian 
armed intervention.   
After this Iphicrates disappears from the Hellenica and nothing more is 
said about his operations in Macedonia and in Thrace, where he was active 
from then onwards
25
.   
 
22
 The famous speech of Callistratus in Hell. VI, 3 is often considered as the true 
voice of Xenophon: see for example HIGGINS 1977, 122; DILLERY 1995, 244. For the im-
portance of this trilogy of speeches cfr. also GRAY 1989, 123-131; BEARZOT 2004, 89.  
23
 “When, accordingly, they proceeded to retire from Lacedaemon, then, of course, 
Iphicrates likewise proceeded to lead back the Athenians from Arcadia to Corinth. Now I 
have no fault to find with any good generalship he may have shown on any other occasion; 
but as regards all his actions at that time, I find them to have been either futile or inexpe-
dient. For while he undertook to keep guard at Oneum so that the Thebans should not be 
able to get back home, he left unguarded the best pass, which led past Cenchreae”.  
24
 Polyaenus describes further diplomatic activities, among which the mediation be-
tween Argives and Arcadians and an avoided clash against the Beotians (see, for example, 
III, 9, 28 and 37). Diodorus, on the contrary, is close to Xenophon in this case, as he dis-
misses the Athenian operations in the Peloponnesus because they were not worth mention-
ing (XV, 65-67). On the historical and historiographical problems arisen by these four The-
ban invasions to Peloponnesus, see for example ROY 1971, 590-594;  BUCKLER 1980, 90, 
185.  
25
 See, for example, Aesch. II, 27-29; Demosth. XXIII, 149; Nep. Iph. 3, 2; KALLET 
1983, 239-252. 
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Therefore, it is true that the portrait of Iphicrates in Xenophon is more 
detailed and positive than that of other strategoi, although this is only be-
cause the historian reserves less attention to the others, and not because he is 
particularly interested in Iphicrates.   
 
Much less favourable is Xenophon's attitude towards Chabrias, many 
episodes of whose career are just ignored.  For example, no mention of his or 
his actions appears until 388, not even his contrasts with Iphicrates in Cor-
inth at the end of the 390s, that lead to the replacement of the latter with 
Chabrias for the strategy
26
.  
The first episode in which Chabrias appears as a major player has also 
very little prominence in Xenophon’s narrative: the nocturnal landing in Ae-
gina that ends with a successful ambush that allows the Athenians to sail un-
disturbed (V, 1, 10-13). Here Chabrias is represented as a mercenaries' com-
mander on his way to Cyprus in aid of Evagoras, i.e. without any official 
role. Nepos records this episode too, but assigns him  an official role
27
.   
Even the apparently favourable comment on the renewed Athenian 
power is immediately toned down, as Antalcidas succeeds in blocking the 
Straits and therefore the Athenian activity on the sea, compelling the Greeks 
to accept a peace according to the Spartan terms.   
After a long silence that covers ten years of history
28
, Xenophon always 
disparages Chabrias' activity in the operations in defence of Boeotia from 
379/8 onwards (that appears limited to the defence of the Athenian neutral-
ity: V, 4, 14); in fact it is only thanks to other sources that we can reconstruct 
his activity together with Timotheus and Callistratus in the organization of 
 
26
 Xenophon, in fact, only hints at generic problems of Iphicrates in Corinth (IV, 8, 
34), whereas Diodorus describes in detail a diplomatic turn over in that area (XIV, 92, 2). 
See, for example, THOMPSON 1985, 51-57. 
27
 Nep. Chabr. 2: “publice ab Atheniensibus Evagorae adiutor datus”. For this expedi-
tion see also TUPLIN 1983, 172. 
28
 During these ten years Chabrias probably conquered ‘international’ glory, thanks to 
his successes in Cyprus and in Egypt. Diodorus called him “a man distinguished both for 
his prudence as general and his shrewdness in the art of war, who had also won great repute 
for personal prowess” (XV, 29, 2). See also Nep. Chabr. 2-3. 
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the Athenian defensive positions on the occasion of the two successive cam-
paigns of Agesilaus
29
.   
Among the operations passed over in silence (particularly on the occa-
sion of the first campaign, but also of the second one), we can place also the 
well-known episode of the clash against the Spartans, that was long-awaited 
by the men of Chabrias with strong contempt of the danger, and that carried 
to Agesilaus’ withdrawal
30
. Xenophon’s silence here is easily comprehensi-
ble, due to Agesilaus’ involvement in these operations and to the will of de-
fending Spartan conduct
31
.   
The account of the subsequent operations is hardly more detailed: not 
even the battle of Naxos, Chabrias' great naval victory against the Spartans 
in 376, earns more than a hint (naumachvsante" pro;" to;n Povllin Cabrivou 
hJgoumevnou nikw`si th`/ naumaciva/: V, 4, 61)
32
. Instead in this account it does 
not look nothing more than a defensive operation to allow for the passage of 
some grain ships, not a true Athenian attack
33
.   
Thus the connection between the battle of Naxus and the defence of 
merchantmen at Geraestus is lost, whereas Diodorus (XV, 34, 3-35) clearly 
distinguishes two different and successful interventions, one on behalf of the 
merchants of grain freed from the grip of the Spartans and the other against 
Naxus, where the Spartan Pollis came to aid of the besieged island.  
 
29
 In particular Diod. XV, 29-34, who compresses the operations in a single cam-
paign. See also Plut. Ages. 26, 7-9; Polyaen. II, 1, 7; 11-12; 18; 20-21, etc.; DEVOTO 1987, 
75-82; CARTLEDGE 1987, 229; HAMILTON 1991, 174. 
30
 This episode was so famous that Chabrias received even a statue for it (see Aristot. 
Rhet. 1411 b 6; Diod. XV, 33, 4; Nep. Chabr. 1, 3). Still,  scholarship debates on the real 
position in which the strategos was represented (if kneeling or standing with his shield 
leaning to his knees; for the ideological significance of these statues in honour of the win-
ners, see now OLIVER 2007; MONACO 2009). 
31
 For the little attention that Xenophon pays to these operations, see now JEHNE 
2004, 468; for the “alternate, and contradictory, version of events” and for the fact that “he 
too often omitted crucial events from his history” see HAMILTON 1991, 162. 
32
 See, on the contrary, Demosth. XX, 76-87; XXIII, 198; Aesch. III, 243; Din. I, 75; 
Diod. XV, 34-35; Plut. Phoc. 6, 5-7; Polyaen. III, 11, 2 and 11, etc.  
33
 Great importance is attributed to this wrong Xenophontic interpretation by TUPLIN 
1993, 159. 
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But, on the other hand, there is no trace of all other operations con-
ducted by Chabrias (and not only) in favour of the expansion of the Second 
Athenian League, that, as we  know, is not even mentioned by Xenophon
34
.   
The seventh and last appearance of Chabrias is only a short reference to 
his mercenaries, who blocked the Argives in the Peloponnesus during the 
second Theban invasion in the 60s. (VII, 1, 25). Any additional, close ex-
amination, however, lacks.   
Although Xenophon says that Chabrias was considered a strategos of 
great value (mavla strathgo;n nomizovmenon: VI, 2, 39), he is not really inter-
ested in his career: there is no attention either to his personality or skills, par-
ticularly in the financial field. It is difficult to say why this is so. Perhaps it 
was because of his link with Callistratus (attested by many sources, and in 
particular by their joint involvement in the trial for the loss of Oropus in 
366
35
), but this may be not enough.  More generally, in this case the Xeno-
phontic will of passing over in silence, as much as possible, the greatest pro-
tagonists of the new Athenian revival and of the Spartan crisis seems clearly 
to emerge.   
 
Furthermore, Xenophon does not even seem to be particularly interested 
in Timotheus, whom he mentions only twice (the naval expedition to the 
Peloponnesus in 376/5 and its results)
36
, although he shows some benevo-
lence towards the character.   
In particular the first mention is of special value (V, 4, 63-66), because 
it concerns a crucial moment of the fourth century history, when the Atheni-
ans, still irritated against the Spartans for Sphodrias’ raid, decided to equip a 
fleet of sixty ships and send it to the Peloponnesus under the command of 
the strategos Timotheus. 
 
34
 On this macroscopic and not at all single omission, and for Xenophon’s silences as 
“art de la déformation”, see LÉVY 1990, 139-140; RIEDINGER 1991, 41; ZAHRNT 2000, 295-
325; JEHNE 2004, 463-480. For the different perspectives of ancient and modern historians 
see also VELA TEJADA 1998, 19. 
35
 For Oropus’ affair, see also infra; Xen. Hell. VII, 4, 1; Demosth. XVIII, 99; Aesch. 
III, 85; Diod. XV, 76, 1; Plut. Demosth. 5, 1; vd. BUCKLER 1980, 250-251; BEARZOT 1987, 
80-99. For the trial: Demosth. XXI, 64; Aristot. Rhet. 1364 a 18-21; Plut. Demosth. 5, 1; 
Diog. Laert. III, 23-24. 
36
 Xen. Hell. V, 4, 63-66; VI, 2, 2-3; 11-13. See now BIANCO 2007, 104. 
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As far as his operations of circumnavigation are concerned, Xenophon 
stresses that Timotheus subjugated Corcyra. Considering the type of inter-
vention performed by the strategos, this formula has a very significant im-
plication, because it seems to allude more to a submission than to a free alli-
ance, if not in the reality, at least in its interpretation
37
.   
The historian not only is silent on the foundation of the Second League, 
but this he interprets as an Athenian imposition, reached through the military 
superiority of few strategoi, whose successes are generally minimized, in-
stead as a free alliance against Sparta.   
Also in the description of Timotheus’ operations during this campaign, 
the historian never emphasizes his diplomatic role (for example, unlike many 
other sources, he does not mention any alliance
38
). We must, however, rec-
ognize that Xenophon underlines his moderation: “as for Timotheus, after he 
had sailed round Peloponnesus he brought Corcyra at once under his control; 
he did not, however, enslave the inhabitants or banish individuals or change 
the government. As a result of this he made all the states in that region more 
favourably inclined to him” (oJ mevntoi Timovqeo" peripleuvsa" Kevrkuran 
me;n eujqu;" uJfæ eJautw'/ ejpoihvsato: ouj mevntoi hjndrapodivsato oujde; a[ndra" 
ejfugavdeusen oujde; novmou" metevsthsen: ejx w|n ta;" peri; ejkei'na povlei" 
pavsa" eujmenestevra" e[scen: V, 4, 64).  
These comments seem anachronistic when referred to the first years of 
existence of the Second Athenian League, but they could allude to an impe-
rialistic evolution in the relations between Athens and her allies
39
, thus pro-
viding also an element for dating the Xenophontic work in a later period of 
crisis
40
.  
 
37
 Scholars are indeed still discussing whether Corcyra was in the Second League or 
not, see, for example, TUPLIN 1984, 545, 551. 
38
 Contra see Diod. XV, 36, 5-6; Nep. Tim. 2, 1. 
39
 Cargill’s theory (1981), which denies the imperialistic evolution of this League, is 
always discussed. 
40
 It is not possible to take into account another very difficult matter, i.e. the genesis 
of the Hellenica, but also these details lead us to date the work in the Fifties, in a context of 
crisis of the Second League, as the Social War: see DAVERIO ROCCHI 1978, 32-34; 
RIEDINGER 1991, 61; DILLERY 1995, 241. 
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The attention on Timotheus’ epimeleia and the list of his merits seem in 
fact to recapitulate the criticism towards the management of the Athenian 
arché, that could be countered by a more moderate hegemonia
41
.   
 Interesting is also the representation of Timotheus' great naval victory 
against Nicholocus at Alyzeia (V, 4, 65-66)
42
: this success seems in fact no 
more than a little naval clash and only due to Athenian superiority in num-
bers. There is also a significant attempt to speak favourably of the Spartan 
navarchus, Nicholocus, who is described as too impulsive, but very brave. 
While searching for redemption, he tried to provoke the Athenians to a sec-
ond battle. This is useful also to further belittle Timotheus’ victory, because 
when he refused the second battle, Nicholocus raised a trophy on his side.   
In this context appears a reference to the situation of lack of means that 
Athens was living and that had many consequences on the campaign (V, 4, 
66). Xenophon does not praise Timotheus’ ability to manage the situation at 
all, which instead other sources do
43
. Such representation is perfectly coher-
ent with the usual attitude of Xenophon, who is both beware of the economi-
cal matters and disinterested in Athenian strategoi
44
.   
When he mentions again Timotheus, in connection with the facts of Za-
cynthus, Xenophon describes briefly the event (VI, 2, 2-3), saying that, im-
mediately after the peace of 375, two ambassadors sailed to reach Timotheus 
and report him the order to come back with the fleet. But, on the way home, 
he disembarked some exiles of Zacynthus on their territory and the Zacynthi 
sent a delegation to Sparta to denounce the offense. After that, the Spartans 
 
41
 So also PERLMAN 1991, 277-278. For the analysis of the civic virtues, that were 
taken into account by Xenophon, see SEAGER 2001, 391, and for the connection between 
“moeurs et politique” AZOULAY 2006, 133-153. 
42
 About this famous victory, mentioned by Xenophon with the correct placing (at 
Alyzeia, which was a little town on the Acarnanian coast in front of the more renowned 
island of Leucades; for this reason in the following centuries the name of Leucades was 
preferred), see also Diod. XV, 36, 5; Polyaen. III, 10, 4, 6, 11-13, etc. 
43
 In particular the second book of the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica (1350 a-b) 
and Polyaenus (III, 10, 1; 9-11). For the importance of the generals’ financial skills, see 
also FRÖLICH 2000, 100. 
44
 Xenophon demonstrates his interest in economic matters particularly in the Oeco-
nomicus and the Poroi;  for the new consciousness of the importance of economic aspects, 
above all in the half of the fourth century and not only in Xenophon, see also FRENCH 1991, 
24-40. 
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considered the Athenians responsible for breaking the peace and prepared a 
new fleet.   
It is especially interesting in this case to compare the account of Xeno-
phon with Diodorus, who provides more details, although in a text full of 
gaps (XV, 45, 2-4). According to him, because of a stasis in Zacynthus a 
group of exiles (not well identified
45
) found shelter in Timotheus’ army. Af-
ter the peace they obtained his collaboration and, thanks to him, could return 
to the island. There they took possession of a stronghold called Arcadia, 
from which, with the support of Timotheus, they moved against the other in-
habitants of the town. The residents of Zacynthus asked for help to the 
Spartans, who first sent an embassy to Athens to denounce Timotheus; but 
when they saw that the demos supported these exiles and did not take the 
necessary steps against the strategos, beginning on the contrary to organize a 
new naval expedition, they prepared a fleet and sent it in aid of the Zacynthi.   
Despite the complexity of these events, it seems possible to conclude 
that Timotheus supported the democratic exiles in their return to the island, 
and that the other Zacynthi did not accepted passively this interference, de-
nouncing the fact to the Spartans and the Spartans to the Athenians. The fact 
that nothing was done against Timotheus is very significant: clearly the 
Athenians did not perceive this as an arbitrary intervention, and revealed 
their will of recovering the greatest number of positions. This could have 
been also an Athenian revenge on the Spartans, who a few years before re-
fused to punish Sphodrias after his raid in Attica.   
The interference of Timotheus in the internal politics of Zacynthus has 
provoked a lot of discussions among scholars, who are divided between 
those who consider his action as a wrongful and little justifiable intervention, 
and those who think that such decision should be rather considered as a nor-
mal result of the general peace
46
.  The exiles for political reasons, in fact, 
were often recalled home after the signing of a peace treaty, and it is not im-
possible that Timotheus helped the return of a group of exiles, who had 
fought with him during the war.   
 
45
 The text in fact has many lacunae in this chapter and it is reasonable to think that 
there has been a change in the subject about the exiles, who must be the democrats and not 
the oligarchs. 
46
 So also STYLIANOU 1998, 364, with status quaestionis. 
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Xenophon does not show hostility towards Timotheus when he stresses 
that the Spartans regarded this as a violation of the agreement and of the 
autonomy of the island; actually, the historian seems even to consider the 
Spartan accusation specious. Moreover, it is necessary to stress that, in this 
interpretation, the fact that Sparta was the first to set up a new fleet, gives 
this polis the responsibility of reopening the war. For Diodorus (XV, 46-47) 
the Athenians were the first to vote the preparation of a new fleet under the 
command of Timotheus.   
For Xenophon, on the contrary, this decision is only an answer to the 
Spartan initiative. In his account, after the intervention of Timotheus in fa-
vour of Zacynthus’ democrats, the Spartan mobilization immediately fol-
lows, and then Athens, when it is involved by the Corcyrean ambassadors 
who ask for help, approves the allocation of a fleet of sixty ships under 
Timotheus (VI, 2, 10-11).   
Such an account, however, while putting directly in connection these 
facts with the renewal of the war, seems too compressed: perhaps it is possi-
ble to think that these phases could be diluted, following the account of Dio-
dorus, who expatiates these events in a longer period of time, of ‘cold war’ 
according to Stylianou
47
.   
In the Hellenica, then, the strategos, not finding sufficient crews for the 
allocated ships, goes around the Aegean islands to recruit men; in this way, 
however, he misses the favourable season for the navigation and is criticized 
by the Athenians, who dismiss and replace him with Iphicrates (VI, 2, 11-
13).   
Xenophon again describes only briefly the dismissal of Timotheus in 
373 and adds his personal, in this case favourable judgment. Here he dis-
agrees with the criticism of the Athenians towards the strategos, and consid-
ers instead his behaviour conscientious.   
But he is not as exaggerated as Diodorus (XV, 47, 2-3), who supports 
that the strategos, before leaving for this campaign, went to Thrace, where 
he invited a lot of towns to join the League and obtained even other thirty 
triremes. This delay provoked the discontent of the people and the dismissal 
of Timotheus from the strategy; but when he returned to Athens, with the 
ambassadors of the new allies, with a bigger perfectly equipped fleet, the 
people would have changed their mind and restored him to his office.   
 
47
 STYLIANOU 1998, 352.  
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The version of Diodorus is usually considered not reliable in this context, 
and rightly so, as it seems biased towards Timotheus, who is wrongly rehabili-
tated and restored. Probably this interpretation is due to the ephorean source 
that scholars normally accept in these books
48
.  
Timotheus, on the contrary, probably delayed his campaign to Corcyra, 
not because he went to Thrace (as Diodorus says) or to the Aegean islands (as 
Xenophon makes us believe), but perhaps for a third reason: he was compelled 
to stop in the Peloponnesus for lack of money and had to resolve many prob-
lems with the allies, according to the speech XLIX of the corpus demostheni-
cum (Against Timotheus for debts, 13-15, 48-50, etc.
49
).   
Xenophon on the whole is unbiased towards the strategos, even if, apart 
from the episode that was meant to avoid an inglorious dismissal for 
Timotheus, usually Diodorus reports a better and more complete account. But 
even though the Athenian is not hostile to Timotheus, sometimes describing 
his behaviour as more innocent than in reality, it is also true that he pays him 
little attention and describes too concisely his operations and only for the sec-
ond half of the 370s. Certainly Xenophon is not our best source for Timotheus 
before or after this time.   
 
Finally, the Xenophontic representation of the strategos Chares is pecu-
liar too, although the historian mentions him only twice in the seventh book, 
but stressing repeatedly his name and with a rather positive judgment.  
The first occurrence is above all significant (VII, 2, 18-23): while dealing 
with his activity in 367/6 in aid of Phlius during the Theban invasions, Xeno-
phon devotes a long account to a small event, whose only result seems to be 
the positive light shed on the value and the pity of Chares.   
He is described as the right man for the intervention to Phlius, a very im-
portant town both for Athens and Sparta, but surrounded by enemies, who 
 
48
 According to STYLIANOU 1998, 372, this is one of the two principal confusions in 
the fifteenth Diodorean book. For the analysis of the reasons of the Diodorean favour to-
wards Timotheus (tracing back probably to his source Ephorus), see now BIANCO 2007, 
109. 
49
 This oration, that can be probably attributed to Apollodorus, the son of the banker 
Pasion, reports many interesting and plausible details about these events, despite a peculiar 
bias against Timotheus: see BIANCO 2007, 30, 98. 
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where the Argives and the Sicyonians
50
. For this reason it was in serious diffi-
culties, while the Athenians were sending to the Peloponnesus one after the 
other their chief strategoi in order to hinder Theban activity, with no success
51
.   
Phlius, however, kept faithful to the alliance with Sparta and Athens, de-
spite the threat of the Argives, who had already attacked and plundered the 
Phliasian territory and then conquered and fortified the Trikaranon; simultane-
ously the Sicyonians had blocked the boundaries of the chora, provoking 
shortage of supplies. So the Phliasians were compelled to go to Corinth to get 
the supplies, but the journey was dangerous. 
Under these conditions of extreme precariousness, they finally found in 
Chares a general who could escort the convoy (h[dh de; pantavpasin 
ajporou`nte" Cavrhta diepravxanto sfivsi parapevmyai th;n parapomphvn: VII, 
2, 18), in what may be considered the first official campaign of the strategos.  
He succeeded not only in defeating the enemies who attacked the convoy, but 
also the Sicyonians who were fortifying a part of the border; his operation was 
conducted with great tactical ability and value, after the celebration of a sacri-
fice that put the men under the inspiration of the deities (VII, 2, 21).   
While Chares was in that region, there was the crisis of Oropus and the 
Athenians mobilized all their forces, recalling also this general from the Pelo-
ponnesus (VII, 4, 1). In Xenophon the two episodes seem almost contemporar-
ies, whereas in Diodorus they are recorded under two different years (367/6 
and 366/5), which is perhaps more likely
52
. This can mean also that the 
strategos obtained the renewal of the office, thanks to his success in the Pelo-
 
50
 Xenophon widely analyzes (VII, 2) Phlius’ problems because of its loyalty to Spar-
ta and Athens; probably this particular attention toward this little town was due to his per-
sonal interests (see also Hell. IV, 4, 15; V, 2, 8; 3, 10). On the paradigmatic attention to 
Phlius see for example GRAY 1989, 165-170; DILLERY 1995, 130; LUPPINO MANES 2000, 
173. 
51
 This was principally the result of Callistratus’ diplomatic action, who had already 
sent Iphicrates (see supra; Xen. Hell. VI, 5, 49; Diod. XV, 63, 2), Chabrias (Xen. Hell. VII, 
1, 25; Diod. XV, 68, 1-2; 69, 1-4), and other strategoi (for example Timomachus: Xen. 
Hell. VII, 1, 41); SEALEY 1956, 178-203; BEARZOT 1978, 7-27. 
52
 Xen. Hell. VII, 2, 1–3, 1; Diod. XV, 75, 3. Chares’ enterprises in that area must 
have been different, as it is well described by THOMPSON 1983, 303-305, who distinguishes 
the events told by Xenophon from those of Diodorus. In this context we can perhaps insert 
Aeschines’ reference (II, 168), who mentions his participation to the armed escort of a con-
voy, without reminding of Chares’ role, because of their political enmity. 
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ponnesus, so that the Athenians decided to send him to the boundary with Boeo-
tia in order to try to resolve this problem.   
However, he probably arrived too late, when the situation was compro-
mised; the Thebans had already seized the town that was crucial for its position 
on the shortest road from Euboea to the grain supplies, while no ally intervened 
to defend Athenian interests.  
Actually, in the sources the role of Chares is unclear. It is possible that he 
did not even arrive to Oropus. Xenophon emphasizes only that his departure 
meant the loss of the control of the port of Sicyon (VII, 4, 1) and immediately 
after he cites Chares’ new intervention in the area of Corinth (VII, 4, 5).  More-
over, it is necessary to remember that this strategos was not involved at all in the 
action brought by the Athenians against Callistratus and Chabrias for the loss of 
Oropus: probably this means that he had nothing to do with this failure.   
Chares had been indeed sent to help the allied Corinth, that was threatened 
by the enemies, in order not to lose the control of a strategic town, as it hap-
pened for Phlius. But the Corinthians feared the intervention of the Athenians 
and preferred to dismiss the army, though with many praises for Chares’ 
promptness.   
Even on this occasion, that could be easily interpreted as a diplomatic hu-
miliation, the historian emphasizes the military and moral skills of the strategos, 
and hastens to explain that if the Corinthians suspected the Athenian good faith 
in this context, it was not because of Chares, but of the Athenian alliance with 
the Arcadians
53
.   
In Xenophon there is no trace of that hostility continuously shown to 
Chares by many sources (both ancient and modern
54
), that led to a true damnatio 
memoriae, whose origin can be found in his accusation against Timotheus at the 
time of the social war
55
.  From this famous trial onwards – that caused the con-
viction of Timotheus and the resentment of his teacher Isocrates – Chares was 
 
53
 BUCKLER 1980, 199, too realizes the Athenian responsibilities in general. 
54
 It is therefore obvious that Chares was not unanimously criticized by the ancients, 
as CARGILL 1981, 193 pretends. For a status quaestionis on criticism on Chares, I don’t re-
peat here what I wrote in BIANCO 2002 and 2003. 
55
 For the sources about this trial: e.g. Isocr. XV, 129; Nep. Tim. 3, 4-5; Diod. XVI, 
21, 4; Polyaen. III, 9, 15 and 29, etc. 
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the pre-eminent object of the orator’s barbs, whose influence was widely 
spread
56
.   
On the contrary, the observation of Xenophon’s neutrality perhaps can also 
carry weight on the difficult matter concerning the dating of the Hellenica
57
, be-
cause it could be a further element to date their composition before (perhaps 
only a little) the negative tradition started by Isocrates in the Antidosis, which 
can be dated at 354/3.   
In any case the attitude of the historian is surprising since, out of the ordi-
nary, he stresses Chares’ military and moral virtues
58
, reminding of his suc-
cesses and minimizing his possible failures, showing him as attentive to the ne-
cessities of defenceless people and pious in religious affairs.  
It is very difficult, however, to understand the reasons of these different 
judgments of Xenophon on the Athenian strategoi of the fourth century, due 
probably to a wide variety of factors, among which we can remember for exam-
ple his admiration for their military skills, in particular as mercenaries’ com-
manders
59
.  
But the general attitude of the historian, as we said, can find coherence in 
the will of minimizing the new Athenian hegemony and obliterating as most as 
possible its chief protagonists
60
.  Perhaps for Xenophon none of them really 
knew how to manage the hegemony and did not deserve to replace the Spartans; 
in Greece by that time only the disorder was reigning sovereign. 
 
Elisabetta Bianco 
elisabetta.bianco@unito.it 
 
56
 BIANCO 2003. Also DAVERIO ROCCHI 1978, 363 n. 4, notes the difference in Xeno-
phon’s treatment of this strategos from the others. 
57
About which see supra, n. 40. 
58
 Among the texts examined, this is the only case in which Xenophon praises moral 
virtues of an Athenian strategos. Interesting the ideas of TAMIOLAKI (forthcoming) that the 
connection between leadership and virtue belongs mainly to the sphere of ideal and that in 
reality the two concepts can perfectly be dissociated. 
59
 For his admiration towards military skills, see for example ANDERSON 1970, 129-
131; HIGGINS 1977, 141. In addition to personal elements, there could be different political 
interpretations: ZAHRNT 2000, 295-325. 
60
 For the Xenophontic will of showing “imperialism’s intrinsic and sometimes ig-
noble futility” see HIGGINS 1977, 126; of denying substance to Athenian fourth century im-
perialism, see TUPLIN 1993, 166-167. 
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